In order to improve public health in areas with air quality problems, the US Clean Air Act imposes a variety of federal regulations on gasoline, which have led to a proliferation of fuel blends known as ''boutique fuels.'' More than 45 fuel blends are sold nationwide. We examine the effects of this program on wholesale gasoline prices. The methodological innovation in this study is the use of a regulatory distance measure as a proxy for measuring market power that arises from product differentiation. We find that Clean Air regulation increases gasoline prices by increasing the cost of refining, but more importantly, by creating regulatory ''islands,'' it segments the market and increases the market power of firms. Our estimation controls for the potential endogeneity of the regulatory variables. We find that OLS techniques systematically underestimate the effect of regulation on gasoline prices. r 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
In order to improve public health in areas with air quality problems, the US Clean Air Act of 1990 led to a variety of federal regulations that aim to reduce emissions from motor vehicles. The Act allows individual states to implement their own clean fuel programs for gasoline to address local or regional air quality concerns. These federal and state regulations have not only led to a significant improvement in air quality but also to a proliferation of clean fuel blends. Differential gasoline standards include the Reformulated Gasoline (RFG) program, the Oxygenated Gasoline (OXY) program, and federal or state programs that impose lower volatility requirements, caps on sulfur content, the use of fuel additives such as methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and ethanol, as well as requirements for minimum oxygen content. differences across states and over time. Using monthly panel data and dummy variables to control for the implementation of RFG and OXY gasoline programs in each state, they measure the direct cost effects of these clean fuel programs. 7 Brown et al. [8] have also investigated the price effect of two gasoline programs: the RFG program and the RVP program, using weekly wholesale prices for selected metropolitan areas. They estimate a reduced-form model using a treatment and control approach. Each regulated city (i.e., each city which is under a RFG or RVP program) is matched with an unregulated city in close geographic proximity. The estimated price effect of gasoline content regulation is found to be on average about 3 cents/gallon, with significant variation (by about 8 cents/gallon) across regulated markets. Their approach focuses on the marginal impact of environmental regulation on gasoline prices by considering the resulting decrease in the number of firms that supply fuel when regulation is introduced. They measure geographical isolation caused by regulation by using two variables: the number of distribution terminals (often called ''distribution racks'' in the industry jargon) with which a city could potentially trade ('the potential partner count') and a 'proximity measure' equal to the sum of the inverse distance between a city and every city with which it could trade. The latter is found significant and negatively related to prices, which lends support to the hypothesis that geographical segmentation may have contributed to the increase in gasoline prices in regulated areas.
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While Brown et al. [8] examine a similar issue, their approach is different than the one in this paper. They use city-level data from selected regions and a treatment and control approach. We use state-level data for the entire country and define regulatory distance by considering the difference in the size of markets under regulation in a given state and its adjoining states. An important difference is that we explicitly model the potential endogeneity of regulation which may arise, for example, when firms lobby the state to introduce regulation beyond the minimum required under Federal guidelines or by introducing a unique fuel. These issues are not considered in their paper. In fact, we show that OLS estimates systematically underestimate the effect of regulation on the wholesale price of gasoline. However, their findings with a complementary technique and disaggregated data support our conclusion that market segmentation following gasoline regulation has led to a significant increase in wholesale prices.
Characteristics of the US gasoline market
The US gasoline market uses about a quarter of the world's crude oil and produces about 40 percent of the world's gasoline. Gasoline prices have been especially volatile in recent years, as shown in Fig. 1 which graphs the monthly price of gasoline and the price of crude oil between 1995 and 2002. This may be partly due to the volatility in the price of crude oil, which accounts on average, for about two-thirds of the price of a gallon of regular grade gasoline. 8 Crude oil supply disruptions stemming from world events, natural disasters and refinery or pipeline outages have had a significant impact on both wholesale and retail gasoline prices. Even when crude oil prices are stable, gasoline prices normally fluctuate due to seasonality: prices tend to rise gradually before and during the summer driving season, and decline in the fall and winter, when people drive less.
Imported and domestically produced crude oil is distilled by refiners and converted into gasoline, kerosene (jet fuel), heating oil and several other petroleum products. Approximately 50 percent of all crude oil in the US is imported but 96 percent of the gasoline consumed is refined domestically [15] . Crude oil is transported in tankers from Europe, Asia and the Middle East and through pipelines from Mexico and Canada into major ports located in the New York Harbor, the Gulf Coast and the West Coast. It is then moved by barge or ARTICLE IN PRESS 7 They do not explicitly model the effect of boutique fuels on market power but recognize the importance of this issue: ''the requirement that stations sell only specially formulated pollution-reducing gasoline increases refining costs and may create market power for wholesalers within a state. To produce reformulated gasoline, refiners must make several costly modifications to their production equipment. If producers in surrounding states avoid incurring these large capital costs, producers in states mandating the use of reformulated or oxygenated gas do not face competition from these out-of-state suppliers'' [9] . 8 During the period 1995-2002, the average wholesale price of gasoline per gallon in nominal terms was 73.9 cents, the retail price was 86.4 cents, and federal and state taxes were 41.3 cents. Thus the nominal retail price inclusive of taxes was $1.28. Since we consider wholesale prices and implicitly assume inelastic demand, state sales and excise taxes on gasoline are excluded from the analysis. pipelines to refineries. Refined petroleum products are mostly carried by pipelines into wholesale terminals, and from there on trucks to retail outlets.
There has been a major restructuring in the US refining industry in recent years. In 1981, 189 firms owned 324 refineries but by the year 2001, only 65 firms were in the industry owning 155 refineries-a decline of about 65 percent in the number of firms and 52 percent in the number of refineries. The market share of the 10 largest refiners increased from 55 to 62 percent. As described in [32] , this consolidation happened during a time period when gasoline demand continued to increase and consumption went up by about 30 percent. Several important mergers occurred in the 1998-2001 time frame beginning with Marathon with Ashland Oil, followed by British Petroleum with Amoco and ARCO, and Exxon-Mobil with Chevron-Texaco. Other important mergers include Philips with Tosco and Conoco and Valero with Ultramar Diamond Shamrock. 9 Table 1 shows state-level data on population, the price of gasoline (in real 1995$), total number of refineries, total refinery capacity, the refinery capacity per capita, the concentration index, and the share of population under RFG and OXY programs. These figures are averaged for the 1995-2002 period (see Appendix A for definitions and sources of data). The states in Table 1 9 There were several reasons for this consolidation. Many small refiners used domestically produced crude oil and benefited from price controls on imported oil during the era of high world oil prices in the 1970s. The end of the Crude Oil Entitlements Program led to the shut down of some of these inefficient units. Conservation programs of the 1970s took effect in the 1980s, reducing demand and hence refining margins. By 1981, only about two-thirds of the refinery capacity was being utilized. In addition, the Clean Air Act of 1990 mandated higher gasoline standards, such as oxygenated and reformulated gasoline, forcing refiners to upgrade their refineries and add to capacity. Many refiners that did not make the necessary investments exited the industry. Recent capacity utilization rates in the refinery industry are routinely more than 90%. Increased concentration and capacity utilization has also meant reduced inventories. Average gasoline storage in 1981 was equal to 40 days consumption. By 2001, it fell to 25 days. This restructuring has resulted in a tight gasoline market characterized by frequent price spikes. 10 Historically, crude oil allocation in the United States has been divided into five petroleum administration for defense districts (PADD). These districts were originally classified during World War II for purposes of administering an oil allocation program. The five PADDs are: West Coast, the Rockies, Midwest, the Gulf Coast and East Coast. The PADD identification of each state is shown in Table 1 . some crude oil is refined. California is an exception with 17 refineries and prices that are among the highest nationally. This premium is due to the state requiring the use of a unique, cleaner and thus costlier, gasoline. The four-firm concentration index, computed as the sum of the largest four market shares for states with a positive number of refineries, is lower than 0.60 in only Texas (0.40) and Louisiana (0.54). 11 
Clean Air regulation of gasoline
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 established a clean fuels program to reduce harmful emissions from motor vehicles. Areas that do not meet EPA national ambient air quality standards are required to implement clean gasoline programs, the most important of which are the RFG and OXY fuel programs.
The RFG program was implemented in January 1995 in areas with major ozone problems. RFG is a gasoline blend that contains lower levels of benzene, sulfur and aromatic compounds. RFG provides the same vehicle performance as regular gasoline but does not evaporate as easily, especially in the summer. It also reduces volatile organic compounds and toxic emissions. Areas with less severe pollution were given the option of using RFG. It is now used in 17 states and the District of Columbia and accounts for nearly 30 percent of the gasoline sold in the US. The RFG program runs for the whole year [13] . RFG fuels must contain 2 percent oxygen by weight, since oxygen aids combustion and thus reduces emissions of certain harmful compounds. But how it is done is entirely at the discretion of the refiner. Most RFG fuels contain the chemical MTBE as an oxygenate (since oxygen cannot be added directly), but in Chicago and Milwaukee, which are closer to the grain-producing regions of the Midwest, ethanol is the oxygenate of choice.
The OXY program was launched in November 1992 and was mandatory in carbon monoxide nonattainment areas in order to reduce its production from gasoline in the winter months. Federal standards require oxygen content to gasoline of at least 2.7 percent by weight. OXY accounts for about 5 percent of the gasoline sold, is run only in winter months (November through February) and averages about 1.3 percent over the whole year [13] . Originally 39 areas qualified for this program, but only 16 of them use OXY at present, the rest having already achieved target regulatory standards.
These regulations are implemented in two steps. First, based on pollution standards for carbon monoxide and ozone, the Clean Air Act mandates the use of regulated gasoline in specific areas in the country. Next, each state that is so regulated can decide to impose more stringent regulation, e.g., by extending the use of RFG or OXY to a larger area than the one required by federal regulation. States can also impose stricter standards on the gasoline content [19, Appendix B] . For instance, two states, California and Minnesota, chose to produce special blends that are not sold in other states. Eleven states decided to impose a lower RVP than what EPA imposed originally.
We focus only on the more important RFG and OXY programs and do not consider state fuel programs that impose lower gasoline volatility requirements and caps on sulfur content. Because of the chemical characteristics of the pollutants, RFG and OXY programs are mutually exclusive except in the Los Angeles region, i.e., either an area is under RFG or under OXY regulation. 12 The price of RFG gasoline is higher than the price of regular gasoline. During the study period, their observed average price differential was about 5 cents, ranging from 2.63 cents in the Gulf Coast region to 8.23 cents in the Midwest [28] . 13 The first explanation for this price difference is that RFG and OXY blends are more costly to produce than regular gasoline as refiners have to make adjustments in their production technology. It is estimated to cost an additional 2-4 cents/gallon to produce these fuels relative to regular gasoline [13] . Although these numbers may seem small, an industry rule of thumb is that a 10 cents/gallon price increase translates into additional annual industry revenues of 10-12 billion dollars [32, p. 20] .
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Shepherd [30] defines a market as a tight oligopoly when this index is above 0.60. Measuring market power through concentration is common in empirical studies as suggested by Mahmood and Lee [26] . Kim and Singhal [25] and Evans and Kessides [20] use the Herfindahl index to measure the degree of concentration while Berger and Hannan [4] and Cotterill [10] use a firm concentration index. It may be useful in the future to perform a robustness check by comparing our results with those using the Herfindahl index as a measure of concentration. 12 Both programs are imposed in the Los Angeles area because of severe urban smog problems coupled with the especially strict regulatory standards in the state of California. 13 Information on the price of OXY gasoline was not available.
A second explanation for the price differential between RFG and regular gasoline is that boutique fuel regulation effectively segments the market, leading some refiners to produce these special fuels while others produce the standard gasoline blends. Yet other refiners may produce multiple blends and vary their output mix over time. In the short run, product differentiation may lead to a smaller number of firms selling in each wholesale market, thereby reducing competition and increasing prices. Our empirical analysis below aims to measure these cost and segmentation effects. Table 2 shows annual descriptive statistics averaged over all states. Refinery capacity per state increased over the study period from 302,649 to 329,125 barrels/day. At the same time, the refinery concentration index remained stable at about 0.60. The share of national population under RFG remained constant (around 0.25) with a decrease for OXY from 0.09 in 1995 to 0.05 in 2002. Some OXY areas achieved their goals and left the program during the study period.
The empirical model
We only consider mid-grade gasoline in the estimation. The average price of gasoline and the price of crude oil are measured in 1995$.
The wholesale price equation
The equation for the wholesale price of gasoline (in logs) denoted by P it can be specified as
where the subscript i ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; NÞ represents states and t ðt ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; TÞ is the time index in years, respectively. 14 The vector x it represents the characteristics of the gasoline market in state i that may affect price The original data for the wholesale price of gasoline and the price of crude oil is by month. When estimating the price model with monthly data, the month-specific indicators were highly significant because of the seasonal effects described earlier. The significance of the parameters of interest was generally higher in the model using annual data. P it . Time effects that affect all states simultaneously are captured by dummies l t . To control for unobserved state heterogeneity, we specify time-invariant, state-specific effects denoted by a i which are estimated as fixed parameters. 15 We include the usual idiosyncratic error term u it with mean zero. Variables that describe the characteristics of the gasoline market in state i include the (log) price of crude oil, the refinery capacity per capita in the state, 16 the refinery concentration index in the state and average distance to refinery, as defined below. We expect a positive relationship between the price of crude oil and the price of gasoline. A state with a higher refinery capacity per capita is expected to have a lower gasoline price, Ceteris paribus. Gasoline prices are expected to be positively correlated with the refinery concentration index. The greater the market concentration, the larger the potential market power of firms in the segmented market.
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An important issue is the need to distinguish transportation costs from non-competitive markups. Some regions may be geographically remote from refineries yet be served by many of them. We would expect prices in such states to be high due to transportation costs. On the other hand, remote regions may be served by only a few refineries; prices in such states could be high both because of the cost of transportation and because of non-competitive markups. Therefore we need to define variables that allow us to distinguish between distance effects and market concentration. As a proxy for transportation costs, we define the variable 'average distance to refinery' for state i in year t by the ratio ð P J j¼1;jai D ij CAP jt = P J j¼1 CAP jt Þ where D ij is the distance (in kilometers) between the capitals of state i and state j, CAP jt is total refinery capacity in state j and year t, and J represents the total number of states in the country. 17 This is the average distance from a state to all refineries in the country, weighted by the capacity of each refinery. This measure is not perfect since state capitals may not be a good proxy for the center of gravity of the gasoline market in the state, and because many states have multiple urban centers. Implicitly this measure also assumes that the refineries in other states are located in the capitals of those states. However, it may serve as a reasonable first approximation in the absence of data on gasoline inflows into states from individual refineries. In the empirical section, we check the validity of this measure as a proxy for transportation costs for each region.
The impact of transportation costs on gasoline price may vary depending on whether a state is an importer of gasoline or not, since a state which has a higher production of gasoline should be less affected by transportation costs. We thus include in the model a cross term defined as the product of refinery capacity per capita and the average distance to refinery.
Clean Air regulation may directly affect the price of gasoline by increasing the cost of refining and distribution (the cost effect). It may also affect the gasoline price indirectly by reducing competition among refineries (the segmentation effect). We measure the cost effect by introducing the relative size S kit of the RFG and OXY markets in each state as explanatory variables in Eq. (1). These are defined as follows:
where POP kit is the population in state i and year t with regulated gasoline of type k ¼ RFG, OXY. The ratio S kit thus measures the relative size of the market covered by the clean fuel program. A larger regulated market leads to a larger market share for clean gasoline and hence, potentially, a higher price.
Variables measuring regulatory distance between states
To test for the effect of segmentation on price in a state, we build a variable that measures regulation in the state relative to regulation in the adjoining states. We implicitly assume that refineries in any state
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When studying an exhaustive population, Arellano [1] suggests that a fixed-effects specification is more appropriate than a randomeffects model. 16 A better fit was obtained with refinery capacity per capita, instead of total refinery capacity. 17 Distance measures between state capitals are great circle distances (''as the crow flies'') computed using latitude and longitude coordinates available from the US Geological Survey. For computational details, see http://www.cpearson.com/excel/latlong.htm. This distance measure varies from an average of 1346 km in the Gulf Coast region to an average of 2321 km in the West Coast. States located in the Gulf Coast region are in general closer to refineries than states in other regions.
compete only with refineries in adjoining states and are not impacted by markets in states located more remotely. 18 We adopt a differentiation index from the literature on international trade [24] in which trade flows between countries is written as a function of GDP per capita and population:
where NPOP kit is the market size (population) for regulated gasoline in the states neighboring state i, and NPOP it is total population in the neighboring states. 19 The index I kit measures the difference in the market size for regulated gasoline in the state and its adjoining states. When I kit takes the minimum value of zero it indicates that the relative size of the regulated market in state i and its neighbors is the same. When it equals the maximum value of one, we have complete differentiation between regulation in state i and its adjoining states. A higher value of I kit implies greater segmentation in the gasoline market, which in turn is likely to lead to a higher price of gasoline. This measure abstracts from accounting for heterogeneity both in the types of crude oil used for refining and in the refinery product mix. Not all refineries produce the same type of gasoline, leading to greater transportation of gasoline than if all refined products were homogenous. In addition, there is heterogeneity in the size of states: California is several times larger than some states on the East Coast. So for California, regulation in surrounding states may have less of an effect than we would expect to observe for a smaller state like Rhode Island. The effect of differential sizes is partly captured by the average distance to refinery index discussed earlier. We have also re-estimated the model with an interaction term between I kit and POP kit but the estimated parameters did not change significantly, as discussed later in the paper. Coastal states may have fewer neighbors, but that also implies that each neighbor has a higher degree of influence which is captured adequately by the I kit index.
Endogeneity of regulation
The choice of a boutique fuel that is different from those used in neighboring states creates opportunities for firms to exercise market power. Even though the regulatory programs we consider in this study are primarily federal, firms may have an incentive to lobby the state to expand area coverage beyond the minimum required under Federal guidelines or to choose a unique fuel. 20 This may not be a major issue in a competitive market, since firms will pass on a large portion of any cost increase to the consumer. However, given the high levels of concentration observed in the refining industry, refiners may be able to influence the choice of regulation and the type of boutique fuels. In particular, they may have an incentive to lobby the federal government to influence the area covered by these regulated fuels, the S kit and I kit variables may be endogenous. The variable measuring market concentration in the state (the refinery concentration index) may also depend on the price of gasoline and hence be endogenous in the price model. As a result, all six variables can be considered endogenous in the model: the wholesale price of gasoline P it and the refinery concentration index RC it may depend on the four variables S kit and I kit (one each for RFG and OXY).
Moreover, dependent variables S kit and I kit can take on a value of zero with positive probability, when states do not impose any regulation on gasoline. Accordingly, OLS estimates are subject to a selectivity bias. We therefore specify each equation for S kit and I kit as a Tobit model for variables censored at zero.
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The use of variables describing market conditions in neighboring states can be found in Baltagi and Levin [2] and Baltagi and Li [3] . These authors build a model in which cigarette consumption in one state is assumed to depend not only on the price of cigarettes in that state but also on the price of cigarettes in neighboring states, the latter reflecting the price of a substitute good. In our case, the dependent variable is price which is affected by the availability of the good in neighboring states, the latter being measured by the difference in the size of the regulated market between a state and its neighbors. 19 We have considered other indices such as the relative size of the regulated gasoline market in the whole region (i.e., state i and its adjoining states) defined by ðPOP kit þ NPOP kit Þ=ðPOP it þ NPOP it Þ. We use the specification which was found to be the most significant in the price model. 20 There is limited evidence that this may have occurred. According to the US Senate [31, p. 74] , some refiners have encouraged states to develop unique fuel requirements in order to create distinct fuel markets with limited competition while simultaneously urging federal officials to reduce the number of fuels nationally. They seem to be arguing both sides of the issue.
As the variables RC it , S kit and I kit also vary across states and through time, we must account for time effects and unobserved state heterogeneity. Thus the full model is a simultaneous equation system which reads:
where (l t , d t , $ t , o t ) are year-specific effects, (a i , t i , c 1ki , c 2ki ) are the state-specific unobserved effects, and (u it , z it , e 1kit , e 2kit ) are the idiosyncratic error terms of the structural equations. The x-vector represents variables that describe the characteristics of the gasoline market in state i, including the (log) price of crude oil, the refinery capacity per capita in the state, the size of the regulated markets (S kit ), the difference in market size (I kit ), the refinery concentration index in the state (RC it ) and average distance to refinery.
The w-vector includes the (log) crude oil price, the (log) wholesale price of gasoline (P it ), refinery capacity per capita, average distance to refinery, the interaction term between refinery capacity per capita and average distance to refinery, state population density, MTBE consumption by state and year, and the S kit and I kit indices.
The z-vector, which is assumed to be the same in the Eqs. (6-9), contains identifying instruments for the impact of environmental regulation (S kit and I kit ) on the price of gasoline (P it ). These instruments are total state population, state population density, share of population classified in non-attainment areas for particulate matter and sulfur dioxide, average number of vehicles per capita, and the ratio of net receipts over net production of gasoline for the corresponding region or PADD. 21, 22 The net receipts over net production of gasoline variable provides a measure of the dependence of each region or PADD on imports from outside the region and is measured at the PADD level and not at the state level. Thus it may be assumed exogenous in the price model. The share of population classified in non-attainment areas for particulate matter and sulfur dioxide provides a measure of the extent of air pollution in each state while not being directly related to RFG and OXY regulation-RFG and OXY regulation are designed to reduce pollution by ozone and carbon monoxide.
To allow for identification of the system parameters, we impose exclusion restrictions on some exogenous variables for appropriate equations, to satisfy the usual rank condition in simultaneous-equation systems. Estimation details for this simultaneous equation system of panel data equations are provided in Appendix B. We use 384 observations corresponding to 48 states over a period of 8 years. The states of Alaska and Hawaii are not considered since the I kit index is not defined for them-they do not share a border with any other state.
Results of estimation
Estimation results for the full six-equation system are reported in Table 3 . For reasons of space, estimates of the year-and state-specific effects in the six equations are not shown but are available through JEEM's online archive of supplementary material, which can be accessed at http://www.aere.org/journal/index.html.
We find that the price of crude oil is a major determinant of gasoline prices, corroborating results in Chouinard and Perloff [9] . The estimated parameter measuring the elasticity of the wholesale price to the price of crude oil is obtained as 0.63. The refinery concentration index has a significant positive coefficient, suggesting a link between concentration and the price of gasoline. Because the variables measuring refinery
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The average number of vehicles per capita in the state was not found significant in the price equation. 22 The East Coast and Midwest PADDs are major importers of gasoline while the Gulf Coast is primarily an exporter. The West Coast and the Rockies exported small quantities of gasoline during the period studied. See Table 1 and footnote 11 for PADD identification and  definition. capacity per capita and average distance to refinery enter the price model non-linearly, their coefficients are not directly interpretable. The marginal effect of the two variables is obtained by computing the derivative of the right-hand side expression with respect to refinery capacity per capita and average distance to refinery, respectively. At the sample mean, we find, as expected, that states with a larger refinery capacity per capita have a lower gasoline price. The marginal effect is estimated at À0.719, significant at the 1 percent level. States with a larger average distance to refinery have a higher gasoline price. The marginal effect is estimated at 0.635, significant at the 1 percent level. To check for the validity of the average distance to refinery measure as a proxy for transportation costs, we compute the marginal effect of this variable at the mean of each region or PADD. The strongest marginal effect of the distance to refinery measure on gasoline prices is obtained for the East Coast region (0.711, significant at the 1 percent level) which is highly dependent on imported gasoline. The lowest marginal effect which is not statistically different from zero is obtained for the Gulf Coast region (0.403) which is largely gasoline self-reliant.
In the price equation, three of the 7-year dummies are found significant at the 5 percent level; five are significant if we consider the 10 percent level. The year 1995 is chosen as the reference. These coefficients capture effects that have had an impact on the gasoline market as a whole (see Fig. 1 ). The largest coefficient is obtained for the year 2001, which may be explained by the combined effect of consolidation in the gasoline market and the terrorist attack on September 11 [32] . Table 3 shows that the four variables used to measure the impact of gasoline regulation, namely S RFG , S OXY , I RFG , I OXY have positive signs, and are highly significant. The larger the relative size of the market for regulated gasoline in a state, the higher the price. This result illustrates the cost effect described earlier: RFG and OXY are more costly to produce than regular gasoline and those states in which a larger segment of the market uses RFG or OXY fuels exhibit a higher price for gasoline. Our estimates indicate that the price of gasoline would increase by 16 percent if a state with no regulation would impose either RFG or OXY regulation to the whole population. 23 The difference in the size of the RFG (respectively, OXY) market between a state and its neighbors is also positively related to the price in the state, suggesting that market segmentation has a positive effect on the price of gasoline. This segmentation effect is found to be highly significant for both the RFG and OXY markets. Compared to a situation in which there is no differentiated regulation between a state and its neighbors (the I kit index is equal to 0), a complete differentiation in the RFG market regulation (respectively OXY market regulation), i.e., when the I kit index is equal to 1, induces an increase in the wholesale price of gasoline by about 14 percent (15 percent for OXY). 24 Several explanatory variables are found significant in the refinery concentration index equation. In particular, the results confirm the positive correlation between gasoline prices and the refinery concentration index. The variable measuring the extent of RFG regulation in each state (S RFG ) has a negative and significant coefficient. This would suggest that the requirement to produce a cleaner gasoline in a state has induced a lower concentration in the refinery sector in that state, all other things equal. Table 4 presents results from a variety of diagnostic tests. We first test for endogeneity of regressors in the first two equations in Table 3 , namely the price and refinery concentration equations. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the OLS estimator would yield consistent estimates and therefore indicates that the refinery concentration index (RC it ) and the indices for environmental regulation (S kit and I kit , k ¼ RFG, OXY) are endogenous in the price equation, and that the use of instruments is justified (w 2 ¼ 83.89, p ¼ 0.000, see Table 4 ). 25 Similarly, the price of gasoline (in logs) and the S kit and I kit indices for environmental regulation are found endogenous in the equation fitting the refinery concentration index (w 2 ¼ 28.82, p ¼ 0.000).
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An increase in the S kit ratio from 0 to 1 induces an increase in the average price of gasoline measured by e 0.151 ¼ 1.163 for the case of RFG and e 0.150 ¼ 1.162 for the case of OXY.
24
Although we consider the most important clean fuel programs RFG and OXY, the price in states with no RFG and OXY regulation may be impacted by other federal and state clean fuel programs that we do not study here. Since we are in effect pooling observations with and without non-RFG and OXY fuels, the mark-ups we estimate are lower bounds. Alternatively, our estimates are relative to prices if no RFG (or OXY) is used. This could be corrected by including a variable that measures the population under all other boutique fuels relative to total state population. However, such data were not easily available. We thank an anonymous referee for this important observation. 25 Under the null of exogeneity of the refinery concentration index RC it and the S kit and I kit indices for environmental regulation, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test-statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with l degrees of freedom, l being the number of endogenous regressors [12] .
Next, we report the Anderson canonical correlations Likelihood Ratio test for underidentification. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is identified and that the instruments are relevant [23] . For both the price equation and the refinery concentration index equation, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level of significance.
Finally, we test that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equations, using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed as Chi-square in the number of overidentifying restrictions. For both the price equation and the refinery concentration index equation, the p-value is above 0.10, thus confirming the validity of the selected instruments.
In Table 5 , we report OLS estimation results for the price equation (including year-and state-specific effects) as benchmark. While the signs of the estimated coefficients are generally the same under OLS and Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS), the magnitudes are different, in particular for the five endogenous variables. This result indicates that OLS systematically underestimates the impact of the variables measuring environmental regulation and refinery concentration on the price of gasoline, suggesting that the endogeneity of these variables needed to be addressed in the estimation.
Concluding remarks
This paper examines the effect of differential Clean Air regulation on wholesale gasoline prices. We consider two major boutique fuels-reformulated and oxygenated fuels which ozone and carbon monoxide from automobile emissions. Using measures that include the relative size of the regulated market in the state as well as the difference in market sizes between a state and its adjoining states, we find that boutique fuels cause an increase in gasoline prices in two ways-by increasing the cost of refining and by segmenting the market and increasing the market power of firms. While the refinery concentration in the regulated market in a state leads to an increase in the price of gasoline, the price is also affected by the regulatory distance between a state and its neighbors. The larger this distance, the higher the price in that state. These conclusions support the notion that heterogeneity in gasoline regulation following the Clean Air Act may have been an important factor in the increase in domestic gasoline prices in recent years, as suggested by several industry analysts [21] .
An important issue addressed in the paper is the potential endogeneity of regulatory policies. For example, firms may lobby their states to extend regulation beyond federally mandated levels or select a unique blend of Table 4 Diagnostic tests gasoline for sale in regulated markets. The econometric model is estimated by treating all the regulatory variables as endogenous. Comparison with OLS estimates suggests that OLS systematically underestimates the effect of regulation on gasoline prices.
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A policy implication is that homogenizing gasoline regulation over the entire country may increase gasoline prices because of the higher cost of regulation but there may be an opposite effect from reduced segmentation in the market. At least for some states that may currently be under little or no regulation but are surrounded by states that are heavily regulated, ratcheting up regulation may lead to a decline in the price of gasoline. It may be useful to examine these state-level price effects in future work especially if a uniform national standard were to be in place. Future research could also focus on extending this analysis to the state or PADD levels with disaggregated price data. One could test for price volatility and examine whether gasoline prices are more volatile in states with heterogeneity in regulation or those at a greater regulatory distance from their neighbors.
In general, the main point of this paper is that while heterogeneity in environmental damages based on population differentials across regions may call for heterogeneity in regulation, one may expect such policies to lead to changes in industry structure, which in turn may have significant welfare implications, as we have shown. Regulatory agencies need to compare these welfare costs to the benefits of alternative proposals including standardization and differentiation of regulation across jurisdictions, even though assessments of environmental damages may be difficult because of stringent information requirements.
Appendix A. Data description and sources
Wholesale gasoline prices are obtained from the Petroleum Marketing Annual reports [28] prepared by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The price of crude oil is the monthly national average price of the composite (domestic and imported) refiner acquisition cost, which is the average price of crude oil purchased by refiners (in cents/gallon). The wholesale price is the monthly average price of regular motor gasoline wholesale sales (in cents/gallon excluding taxes) within the state. We deflate prices using the consumer price index (CPI) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Refinery capacity (in million barrels per calendar day) is the aggregate capacity of all refineries operating in the state (source: EIA). Information on refineries was missing for the years 1996 and 98, so 1995 and 1997 figures were used as substitutes. 26 Total refinery capacity is a good proxy for crude oil production since the annual average refinery utilization rate regularly exceeds 90 percent of installed capacity [32, p. 5] . These figures are used to compute the market share (based on capacity) of each firm owning a refinery in any given state and the firm concentration index is defined as the sum of the largest four market shares. 27 These indices are computed on an annual basis. MTBE consumption by state and year were obtained from EIA [18] . Consumption is measured in 1000 barrels/day. Net production and net receipts of gasoline by PADD and year were obtained from the Petroleum Supply Annual, Volume 2 (1995 Volume 2 ( -2002 prepared by the EIA.
Information on control areas under the RFG and OXY programs, as well as population in non-attainment areas for particulate matter and sulfur dioxide, was obtained from EPA. EPA also provided data on the population of the mandated and opt-in RFG control areas and the population of OXY control areas, both estimated as of July 1, 1996 . The duration of the oxygenated fuel programs is for at least 4 months, and typically runs from November 1 to February 29, although it may vary by state. We control for the period of implementation (number of days per month) for the OXY program (source: [14] ).
Information on population by state and year was obtained from the US Census bureau, and vehicle registration data were obtained from the US Federal Highway Administration.
